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Much  of  empirical  economics  involves  regression  analysis.  However,  does  the   
presentation of results affect economists’ ability to make inferences for decision making 
purposes?  In  a  survey,  257  academic  economists  were  asked  to  make  probabilistic 
inferences on the basis of the outputs of a regression analysis presented in a standard 
format. Questions concerned the distribution of the dependent variable conditional on 
known values of the independent variable. However, many respondents underestimated 
uncertainty  by  failing  to  take  into  account  the  standard  deviation  of  the  estimated 
residuals. The addition of graphs did not substantially improve inferences. On the other 
hand,  when  only  graphs  were  provided  (i.e.,  with  no  statistics),  respondents  were 
substantially more accurate. We discuss implications for improving practice in reporting 
results of regression analyses. 
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I.   Introduction 
 
The leading journals in economics are the life-blood of the profession in that they report 
high quality, peer-reviewed research on the latest theoretical and empirical developments. 
As such, the findings are of great interest to a wide range of social scientists ranging from 
theoreticians to practically-minded economists working on applied problems. In dealing 
with almost any issue, these scientists all face two questions: (1) Which variables are 
important in explaining economic outcomes? and (2) How important are the variables 
that have been identified? 
  Our contention in this paper is that the manner in which the results of empirical 
analyses are presented in leading economics journals hinders the ability of economists to 
answer these questions.  This is especially the case when the work requires interpretation 
from a decision making perspective as required, for example, in policy analysis.   
Whereas it can be argued that how information is presented should not affect 
rational  interpretation  and  analysis,  there  is  abundant  psychological  evidence 
demonstrating presentation effects.  Many studies have shown, for example, how subtle 
changes in questions designed to elicit preferences are subject to so-called framing and 
other  contextual  influences  (see,  e.g.,  Kahneman  &  Tversky,  1979;  Hogarth,  1982; 
Tversky & Kahneman, 1986).  Moreover, these have been reported in both controlled 
laboratory  conditions  and  field  studies  involving  appropriately  motivated  experts 
(Camerer,  2000;  McNeil  et  al.,  1982;  Thaler  &  Sunstein,  2008).  Human  information 
processing  capacity  is  limited  and  the  manner  in  which  attention  is  allocated  has 
important implications for both revealed preferences and inferences (Simon, 1978). 
Recently,  Gigerenzer  and  his  colleagues  (Gigerenzer  et  al.,  2007)  reviewed 
research on how probabilities and statistical information are presented and consequently 
perceived by individuals or specific groups that use them frequently in their decisions. 
They show that mistakes in probabilistic reasoning and miscommunication of statistical 
information are common in everyday situations, resulting in misperceptions and irrational 
decisions.  Their  work  focuses  mainly  on  the  fields  of  medicine  and  law,  where  in 
particular situations, doctors, lawyers and judges fail to communicate crucial statistical   3 
information appropriately thereby leading to biased judgments that impact negatively on 
others.  
We  examine  how  economists  communicate  statistical  information  among 
themselves. Specifically, we note that much work in empirical economics involves the 
technique of regression analysis. However, when we asked a large sample of economists 
to  use  the  standard  reported  outputs  of  regression  analysis  to  make  probabilistic 
inferences for decision making purposes, they experienced considerable difficulty. The 
reason, we believe, is that current reporting practices focus attention on the uncertainty 
surrounding model parameter estimates and fail to highlight the uncertainty concerning 
outcomes of the dependent variable conditional on the model identified. On the other 
hand, when attention is directed appropriately – by, for example, graphical as opposed to 
tabular means – the quality of our respondents’ inferences increases dramatically. 
This  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  In  the  next  section  (II),  we  provide  some 
background on the practice and evolution of reporting empirical results in journals in 
economics and contrast this with developments in other social sciences. Subsequently 
(section  III)  we  provide  information  concerning  the  survey  we  conducted  with 
economists that involved answering four decision-oriented questions based on a standard 
format for reporting results of regression analysis. There were six different conditions 
designed  to  assess  differential  effects  due  to  model  fit  (R
2)  and  different  forms  of 
graphical  presentation  (with  and  without  accompanying  statistics).  In  section  IV,  we 
present  our  results.  In  brief,  these  show  that  the  typical  presentation  format  –  that 
highlights regression coefficients and their standard errors – leads respondents to ignore 
the level of predictive uncertainty in the model that is captured by the standard deviation 
of  the  estimated  residuals.  As  a  consequence,  uncertainty  is  grossly  underrated.  
Moreover, adding graphs does little to ameliorate the situation. On the other hand, the 
provision of graphs alone – without regression statistics – does lead to more accurate 
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II.   Current practice 
 
There are many sources of empirical analyses and findings in economics.  To obtain a 
representative sample of current “best” practice, we selected articles published in the 3
rd 
issues (of each year) of four leading journals between 1998 and 2007 (441 articles). The 
journals  were  American  Economic  Review  (AER),  Quarterly  Journal  of  Economics 
(QJE), Review of Economic Studies (RES) and Journal of Political Economy (JPE). Many 
articles published in these journals are empirical.  Over 70% of the empirical analyses use 
variations of regression analysis of which 75% have linear specifications.  This suggests 
that regression analysis is the most prominent tool used by economists to test hypotheses 
and  identify  relations  among  economic  and  social  variables.  The  use  of  regression 
analysis  is  also  common  in  other  fields  such  as  political  science,  psychology,  and 
education (Gall et al., 1996; Willson, 1980; Pedhazur, 1997).   
  Empirical studies published in economics journals follow a common procedure to 
display and evaluate results. In a typical study, authors provide a table that displays the 
descriptive statistics of the data sample used in the analysis. Before or after the display of 
this information, they describe the specification of the model on which the analysis is 
based. Then the regression results are provided in detailed tables. In most cases, these 
results  include  the  coefficient  estimates  and  their  standard  errors  along  with  other 
frequently  reported  statistics,  such  as  the  number  of  observations  and  R
2.    Table  1 
summarizes these details with respect to the sample of studies referred to above. This 
shows that, apart from the regression coefficients and their standard errors (or t-statistics), 
there is not much agreement on what else should be reported. The data suggest, therefore, 
that – as a group – economists probably understand well the inferences that can be made 
about  regression  coefficients  or  the  average  impact  of  manipulating  an  independent 
variable; however, their ability to make inferences about other probabilistic implications 
is  possibly  less  well  developed  (e.g.,  predicting  individual  outcomes  conditional  on 
specific inputs).  
------------------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 1 about here 
-------------------------------------------------   5 
It is not clear when, how, and why the above manner of presenting regression 
results  in  publications  emerged.  No  procedure  is  made  explicit  in  the  submission 
guidelines for the highly ranked journals. Moreover, popular econometric textbooks, such 
as Greene (2003), Judge (1985) and Gujarati (1988) do not explain specifically how to 
present estimation results or how to use them for decision making.  An exception is 
Wooldridge (2008), who dedicates several sections to issues of presentation. His outline 
suggests that a good summary of an analysis consists of a table with selected coefficient 
estimates and their standard errors, R
2 statistic, constant, and the number of observations.  
Indeed, this seems to be consistent with today’s practice, as more than 60% of the articles 
in Table 1 follow a similar procedure.  
Publications from the 1950’s and 1960’s display and discuss results in a fashion 
similar to today, even though in that period empirical analyses constituted a minority of 
the studies published in QJE, AER, JPE and RES (about 25% vs. today’s 50%). Hence, 
despite  the  considerable  growth  and  advances  in  empirical  work  in  economics  –  due 
undoubtedly to developments in computational technology – the content of the display 
and  discussion  of  results  has  remained  remarkably  constant  over  time.  Widely  used 
statistical software, such as STATA, RATS, SPSS or MS-EXCEL display statistics and 
regression results in a way analogous to the tables used in published papers, but provide a 
larger number of statistics, out of which only a handful are selected by the authors and 
discussed in the publications. 
The presentation of statistical results has been debated over the years in different 
fields  of  research  and  has  led  to  several  innovations.  For  example,  augmenting 
significance tests with effect size became a common practice in differential psychology in 
the 1980’s. This has also been adopted by empirical scientists in fields such as sociology 
and political science where it is used to analyze treatment effects in experiments or to 
conduct  meta-analyses.  Psychological  Science,  the  flagship  journal  of  the  research 
oriented  Association  for  Psychological  Science  is  probably  the  leader  in  advocating 
specific statistical reporting practices in the social sciences. For example, its “Information 
for Contributors” explicitly states “Effect sizes should accompany major results. When 
relevant,  bar  and  line  graphs  should  include  distributional  information,  usually 
confidence intervals or standard errors of the mean.”     6 
In economics, McCloskey and Ziliak (1996) provided an illuminating study of 
statistical practice based on articles published in AER in the 1980s. They demonstrated 
widespread confusion in the interpretation of statistical results due to confounding the 
concept of statistical significance with notions of economic or substantive significance.  
Too  many  “results”  were  dependent  on  whether  t  or  other  statistics  simply  exceeded 
arbitrarily defined limits. Although we have not conducted any formal analysis, we have 
little reason to believe that the situation has changed since the 1980s.   
 Practice in empirical finance provides an interesting exception.  In this field, once 
statistical analysis has identified a variable as “important” in affecting, say, stock returns, 
it is standard to assess “how important” by evaluating the performance of simulated stock 
portfolios  that  use  the  variable.   In  short,  by  using  the  information  contained  in  the 
variable  when  it  becomes  available  to  market  participants,  what  increase  in  future 
portfolio value can be gained?  For applications of this method to evaluating performance 
of active fund managers, see Jensen (1968) and Carhart (1997). 
At the beginning of the 1990’s, several researchers in political science showed 
interest in the predictive power of published models and discussed the effectiveness of 
the  statistics  reported  in  providing  individuals  with  reliable  information  for  decision 
making. Specifically, King (1990a, 1990b), Krueger and Lewis-Beck (2007), Lewis-Beck 
and Skalaban (1990a, 1990b, 1991) narrowed down the methodological aspects of this 
issue to a rivalry between R




2 advocates argue that, as a bounded and standardized quantity, this statistic 
is the best option to describe the fit of a model and a useful measure of the relative 
predictive abilities of different specifications. The SDER advocates, on the other hand, 
argue that R
2 statistics may vary considerably among different samples whereas SDER 
provides  information  on  the  degree  of  predictability  in  the  metric  of  the  dependent 
variable. Despite the different points of view, there is agreement that both statistics aid 
                                                 
1  We use the initials SDER to indicate the standard deviation of the estimated residuals. Some sources refer 
to this as the Standard Error of Estimate or SEE (see RATS), some others as root Mean Squared Error or 
root-MSE (see STATA). Wooldridge (2008) calls it the Standard Error of Regression (SER) defining it as 
“an estimator of the standard deviation of the error term.”    7 
decision  makers  in  understanding  different  aspects  of  the  level  of  predictability 
associated with the analyses.  
Table 1 shows that SDER is practically absent from the presentation of results. 
Less than 10% of the studies provide it.  R
2 seems to be the prevalent statistic reported to 
provide an idea of model fit. This is the case for 80% of the published articles with a 
linear specification.   
It is difficult to assess the magnitude of the uncertainty in a regression analysis 
without  knowing  both  the  R
2  statistic  and  the  standard  deviation  of  the  dependent 
variable. However, Table 1 shows that more than 40% of the publications in our sample 
that utilize a linear regression analysis do not provide information on at least one of these 
statistics. Hence, a decision maker who is consulting these studies cannot infer much 
about the cloud of data points on which the regression line is fit. Alternatively, a scatter 
plot would be essential to perceive the degree of uncertainty. However, less than 40% of 
publications  in  our  sample  of  regression  analyses  provide  a  graph  with  actual 
observations.  
Given the prevalence of empirical analyses and their potential use for decision 
making, debates about the appropriate way to present results are important. However, 
none of these previous debates is based on systematic evidence of how knowledgeable 
individuals use the current tools for making probabilistic inferences, and how – given an 
estimated  model  –  specific  statistics  and  different  ways  of  presenting  results  affect 
judgment.  The purpose of this investigation is to illuminate this issue.   
 
 
III.  The survey 
Goal and design  
The  goal  of  our  survey  was  to  investigate  how  knowledgeable  individuals 
(economists) interpret specific decision making implications of the standard output of a 
regression  analysis.  We  applied  the  following  criteria  to  select  the  survey  questions.  
First,  we  provided  information  about  a  well-specified  model  that  met  the  underlying 
assumptions of regression analysis. Second, the model was straightforward in that it had 
only one independent variable. Third, all the information necessary to solve the problems   8 
we  posed  was  available  from  the  output  provided  in  the  analysis.  Fourth,  although 
sufficient  information  was  available,  respondents  needed  to  apply  knowledge  about 
statistical inference to make the calculations necessary to answer the questions.  That is, 
respondents had to go beyond just the information provided.  
This  last  criterion  is  the  most  demanding  because,  we  believed,  whereas 
economists  may  be  used  to  interpreting  the  statistical  significance  of  regression 
coefficients, they typically do not assess the uncertainties involved in prediction when an  
independent  variable  is  changed  or  manipulated  (apart  from  making  “on  average” 
statements that give no hint as to the distribution around the average). However, these 
statements are essential for decision making.  For example, imagine that a regression has 
been carried out showing the relation in a specific population between annual earnings 
(dependent variable) and years-spent-at-school (independent variable).  Now, consider a 
specific  person  from  the  same  population  who  has  spent  k  years-at-school  and  is 
considering spending an additional year (i.e., by increasing k to k+1).  From a decision 
perspective, obvious questions center on the probable effects of this additional year on 
earnings. What, for example, is the probability that an extra year at school will lead to 
earnings in excess of a specific level? This is precisely the kind of question we ask our 
respondents. 
  The design of our study  required that respondents answer four such questions 
after  being  provided  with  information  about  an  underlying  regression  analysis.  Our 
survey involved six conditions and Figures 1 and 2 report the information provided to the 
respondents for Conditions 1 and 2, respectively. We make three comments about these 
set-ups. First, the information provided is similar in form and content to the outputs of 
many regression analyses reported in the economic literature (and consistent with the 
prescriptions  of  Wooldridge,  2008).  Second,  all  the  assumptions  of  regression  are 
satisfied  in  a  way  that  might  not  be  strictly  possible  with  empirical  data  (thus  the 
estimated  model  contains  information  concerning  all  uncertainties  involved  in 
prediction). Third, the main difference between Conditions 1 and 2 lies in the overall “fit” 
of the regression model.  In Condition 1, R
2 is 0.50; in Condition 2, it is 0.25.  
------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figures 1 and 2 about here 
------------------------------------------------   9 
  A possible critique of Conditions 1 and 2 is that some economists would also like 
information in the form of the bivariate scatter-plot of the dependent and independent 
variables  as  well  the  standard  deviation  of  the  estimated  residuals  (indeed,  as  noted 
above,  in  some  reports  both  can  be  found).  Conditions  3  and  4  were  the  same  as 
Conditions 1 and 2, respectively, except that this additional information was included – 
see Figures 3 and 4. 
------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figures 3 and 4 about here 
------------------------------------------------ 
  Finally,  we  explored  what  would  happen  if,  instead  of  the  usual  reporting  of 
regression  statistics,  respondents  were  forced  to  respond  to  our  questions  by  simply 
consulting graphs. Thus, in Conditions 5 and 6, the statistical outputs of the regression 
analyses were not provided but the bivariate graphs of the dependent and independent 
variables were, as in Figures 3 and 4.
2  
  In summary, differences between each of Conditions 1 and 2, 3 and 4, and 5 and 
6, all reflect differences in variance explained (R
2 of 0.50 versus R
2 of 0.25). Conditions 
3 and 4 add graphs and SDER to the information in Conditions 1 and 2. And the results 
of the regression analyses are limited to graphs in Conditions 5 and 6. 
  It is important to add that in published papers, results are also discussed verbally. 
These detailed discussions, which are mostly confined to certain coefficient estimates and 
their significance, might distract decision makers from the uncertainties about outcomes. 
None  of  our  conditions  involve  such  discussions.  Furthermore,  in  publications,  some 
discussions describe relations among variables using attributes, such as “strong”, “weak”, 
“determinant”, “predictor” etc. relying solely on the statistical significance of coefficient 
estimates. It might be possible that these explanations, which are a part of the current 
rhetoric used in reporting results, frame decision makers into believing that the results 





                                                 
2 We thank Rosemarie Nagel for suggesting that we include Conditions 5 and 6.   10 
 
Questions 
For Conditions 1, 3, and 5, we asked the following questions:   
1.  What would be the minimum value of X that an individual would need to 
make sure that s/he obtains a positive outcome (Y>0) with 95% probability? 
2.  What minimum, positive value of X would make sure, with 95% probability, 
that the individual obtains more Y than a person who has X=0? 
3.  Given that the 95% confidence interval for β is (0.936, 1.067), if an individual 
has X=1, what would be the probability that s/he gets Y>0.936?  
4.  Given that the 95% confidence interval for β is (0.936, 1.067), if an individual 
has X=1, what would be the probability that s/he gets Y>1.001 (i.e. the point 
estimate)? 
 
          The questions for Conditions 2, 4, and 6 were the same except that the confidence 
interval for β in questions 3 and 4 is (0.911, 1.130), and we ask respectively about the 
probabilities  of  obtaining  Y>0.911  and  Y>1.02,  given  X=1.  All  four  questions  are 
reasonable in that they seek answers to questions that would be of interest to decision 
makers.  However – and as noted above – they are not the types of questions that reports 
in economic journals usually lead readers to pose.  They therefore test a respondent’s 
ability  to  reason  correctly  in  a  statistical  manner  given  the  information  provided.  In 
Appendix A, we provide the rationale behind the correct answers. 
 
Respondents and method   
  We  sent  web-based  surveys  to  faculty  members  in  economics  departments 
worldwide. One hundred and thirteen departments were randomly selected from a list of 
150  compiled  by  Baltagi  (2007,  Table  3)  who  ranks  economics  departments  of 
universities  worldwide  by  their  econometric  publications  between  1989  and  2005.
3  
Within each department, we randomly selected up to 32 faculty members. We ordered 
                                                 
3 We stopped sampling universities once we had at least 30 individual responses for all questions asked. A 
few  universities  were  not included in our sample because their  web pages did not  facilitate accessing 
potential respondents. This was more frequent for non-US universities. For reasons of confidentiality, we 
do not identify any of these universities.   11 
them  alphabetically  by  their  names  and  assigned  Condition  1  to  the  first  person, 
Condition  2  to  the  second  person,  …  ,  Condition  6  to  the  sixth  person,  then  again 
Condition 1 to the seventh person and so on.   
We conducted the survey online by personally sending a link for the survey along 
with a short explanation to the professional email address of each prospective participant. 
In this way, we managed to keep the survey strictly anonymous. We do know the large 
pool of institutions to which the participants belong but have no means of identifying the 
individual  sources  of  the  answers.    The  participants  answered  the  survey  voluntarily. 
They had no time constraints and were allowed to use calculators or computers if they 
wished.  We told all prospective participants that, at the completion of the research, the 
study along with the feedback on questions and answers would be posted on the web and 
that they would be notified.
4 We did not offer respondents any economic incentives for 
participation but note that it is not clear what difference such incentives would make in 
the present case (Camerer & Hogarth, 1999).  
When starting our investigation we had little idea as to how many economists 
would actually respond to our survey.  We therefore started collecting data for Conditions 
1  and  2  from  a  group  of  economics  departments  that  are  not  in  our  final  sample  to 
estimate how many requests would be needed to achieve sample sizes of between 30 and 
40 in each condition.  Based on our experience of Conditions 1 and 2, we proceeded to 
collect data for all conditions. As can be seen from Table 2, we dispatched a total of 
3,013 requests to participate.  About one-fourth of potential respondents (26%) opened 
the survey and, we presume, looked at the set-ups and questions. However, only about a 
third (or 9% of all potential respondents) actually completed the survey.  The proportion 
of  potential  respondents  who  opened  the  surveys  and  responded  was  highest  for 
Conditions 5 and 6 (40%) as opposed to the 30% and 32% in Conditions 1 and 2, and 3 
and 4, respectively. The average time taken to complete the survey was also lowest for 
Conditions 5 and 6 (see foot of Table 2). We will consider these outcomes again when we 
discuss the results below.   
---------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
--------------------------------------------- 
                                                 
4 This was, in fact, done before the end of January 2010.   12 
  Table  2  documents  characteristics  of  our  respondents.  In  terms  of  position,  a 
majority (59%) are at the rank of Associate Professor or higher. They also work in a wide 
variety of fields within the economics profession (respondents could indicate more than 
one  area  of  specialization).  Thirteen  percent  of  respondents  classified  themselves  as 
econometricians and more than two-thirds (77%) used regression analysis in their work 
(41% “often” or “always”). Whereas we cannot say whether our sample is representative 
of academic economists, it is quite large and undoubtedly captures a large number of 
competent professionals.    
 
IV.  Results 
Condition 1 
  Respondents’ answers to Condition 1 are summarized in Figure 5. Three answers 
incorporating only “I don’t know”, or “?” were removed from the data. We also regarded 
as correct the answers of 4 participants who did not provide numerical responses, but 
mentioned  that  the  answer  was  related  to  the  error  term  and  to  its  variance
5.  The 
questions and the correct answers are displayed in the titles of the histograms in Figure 5.  
-------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 5 about here 
-------------------------------------------------- 
Most answers to the first three questions are incorrect.  They suggest that the 
presentation of the results frames the respondents into evaluating the results only through 
the coefficient estimates and obscures the uncertainties implicit in the dependent variable.  
Specifically, Figures 5a through 5d show that:  
1.  72% of the participants believe that for an individual to obtain a positive outcome 
with 95% probability, a small X (X<10) would be enough, given the regression 
results. A majority state that any small positive amount of X would be sufficient 
to obtain a positive outcome with 95% probability.  
2.  68% of the answers to the second question suggest that for an individual to be 
better off with 95% probability than another person with X=0, a small amount of 
X (X<10) would be sufficient.  
                                                 
5 Across all the Conditions there were 21 such responses.    13 
3.  60% of the participants suggest that given X=1, the probability of obtaining an 
outcome  that  is  above  the  lower  bound  of  the  estimated  coefficient’s  95% 
confidence interval is very high (greater than 80% instead of 51%). 
4.  84% of participants gave a correct answer to question 4.   
 
        Participants’  answers  to  the  first  two  questions  suggest  that  the  uncertainty 
affecting  Y  is  not  directly  visible  in  the  presentation  of  the  results.  The  answers  to 
question 3, on the other hand, shed light on what our sample of economists see as the 
main source of fluctuation in the dependent variable.  The results suggest that it is the 
uncertainty concerning the estimated coefficients that is seen to be important and not the 
magnitude  of  the  SDER.  The  apparent  invisibility  of  the  random  component  in  the 
presentation  seems  to  lure  decision  makers  into  disregarding  the  error  term  and  to 
confuse an outcome with its estimated expected value. In their answers to questions 3 and 
4, the majority of participants claim that if someone chooses X =1, the probability of 
obtaining Y>1.001 has a 50% chance, but obtaining Y>0.936 is almost certain.
6   
    Our findings echo those of Lawrence and Makridakis (1989) who showed in an 
experiment  that  decision  makers  tend  to  construct  confidence  intervals  of  forecasts 
through  estimated  coefficients  and  fail  to  take  into  account  correctly  the  randomness    
inherent in the process they are evaluating. They are also consistent with Goldstein and 
Taleb (2007) who have shown how failing to interpret a statistic appropriately can lead to 
incorrect assessments of risk. In the case of Condition 1, the information about the error 
term  is  not  transparent;  respondents  only  associate  uncertainty  with  the  coefficient 
estimates  and  their  variation.  This  biases  decision  makers’  perceptions  of  the 
predictability of outcomes.  
In  sum,  the  results  of  Condition  1  show  that  the  common  way  of  displaying 
results  in  the  empirical economics  literature  obscures  the  uncertainty  surrounding  the 
analyzed outcomes. The data suggest that the lack of predictability is invisible to the 
                                                 
6 Incidentally, the high rate of correct answers to question 4 suggests that failure to respond accurately to 
questions 1-3 was not because participants failed to pay attention to the task (i.e., they were not responding 
“randomly”).  
   14 
respondents. In Condition 2, we tested this interpretation by seeing whether the answers 
to Condition 1 are robust to different levels of uncertainty.  
 
Conditions 2 through 4   
If  the  presentation  of  the  results  causes  the  error  term  to  be  ignored,  then 
regardless  of  its  variance,  the  answers  of  the  decision  makers  should  not  change  in 
different set-ups, provided that its expectation is zero. To test this, we change only the 
variance of the error term in Condition 2 – see Figure 2.  Conditions 3 and 4 replicate 
Conditions 1 and 2, respectively, except that we add scatter plots and SDER statistics – 
see Figures 3 and 4. 
The histograms of the responses to the four questions of Conditions 2, 3, and 4 are 
remarkably  similar  to  that  of  Condition  1  (see  Appendix  B).    These  similarities  are 
displayed in Table 3.      
----------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
---------------------------------------------- 
Note that we are not arguing that economists consider only averages when making 
predictions.  For  most  respondents,  Conditions  1  and  2  ask  unfamiliar  questions  that 
inquire about values and probabilities that are not related to coefficient estimates. They 
are  not  issues  that  are  typically  discussed  in  papers  that  publish  regression  analyses. 
Nonetheless, the similarity in responses between Conditions 1 and 2 shows that – under 
the  influence  of  the  current  methodology  –  economists  could  be  overestimating  the 
effects  of  explanatory  factors  on  economic  outcomes.  The  misperceptions  in  the 
respondents’  answers  suggest  that  the  way  regression  results  are  presented  in   
publications  can  blind  even  the  most  knowledgeable  individuals  from  differentiating 
among different clouds of data points and uncertainties. Parenthetically, at an early stage 
of our investigation, we conducted the same survey (using Conditions 1 and 2) with a 
group of 30 academic social scientists.  The results (not reported here) were quite similar 
to those of our larger sample of economists. 
Table 3 suggests that when the representation is augmented with a graph of actual 
observations and with statistical information on the magnitude of the error term (SDER), 
the perceptions of the relevant uncertainty  and  consequently the predictions improve.   15 
However, around half of the participants still fail to take into account the error term when 
making  predictions  and  give  similar  answers  to  those  in  Conditions  1  and  2.  This 
suggests that respondents still mainly rely on the table showing the estimated coefficients 
and their standard errors as the main tool for assessing uncertainty. Since the information 
provided in Conditions 3 and 4 is rarely provided in published papers (in the surveyed 
sample of studies only around 10% gave the SDER and 30% provided scatter plots with 
such detail), this does not provide much hope for improvement. Possibly more drastic 
changes in presentation are necessary to improve the perception of the predictability of an 
analyzed outcome. Conditions 5 and 6 were designed for this purpose. 
 
Conditions 5 and 6 
  Our results so far suggest that, in trying to answer our questions, economists pay 
excessive attention to coefficient estimates and their standard errors and fail to consider 
the uncertainty inherent in the relation between the dependent and independent variables. 
What  happens,  therefore,  when  they  cannot  see  estimates  of  coefficients  and  related 
statistics but only have a bivariate scatter plot?  This is the essence of Conditions 5 and 6 
– see the graphs in Figures 3 and 4. 
---------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figures 6 and 7 about here 
--------------------------------------------------- 
Figures  6  and  7  display  the  histograms  of  responses  to  the  four  questions  in 
Conditions  5  and  6,  respectively.  These  show  that  participants  are  now  much  more 
accurate in their assessments of uncertainty compared to the previous Conditions (see 
also Table 3). In fact, when the coefficient estimates are not available, they are forced to 
pay attention solely to the graph, which depicts adequately the uncertainty within the 
dependent variable. This further suggests that scant attention was paid to the graphs when 
coefficient estimates were present.  Despite the “unrealistic” manner of presenting the 
results, Conditions 5 and 6 show that a simple graph can be better suited to assessing the 
predictability of an outcome than a table with coefficient estimates or a presentation that 
includes both a graph and a table.  
In Conditions 5 and 6, most of the participants, including some of those who 
made the most accurate predictions, protested in their comments about the insufficiency   16 
of information provided for the task. They claimed that, without the coefficient estimates, 
it  was  impossible  to  determine  the  answers  and  that  all  they  did  was  to  “guess”  the 
outcomes approximately. Yet their guesses were more accurate than the predictions in the 
previous Conditions that resulted from careful investigation of the coefficient estimates 
and  time-consuming  computations.    Indeed,  as  indicated  in  Table  2,  respondents  in 
Conditions 5 and 6 spent significantly less time on the task than those in Conditions 1 and 
2 (t = 2.95 and 2.57, p = 0.005 and 0.01, respectively), and the participation rate was 
slightly  higher  although  not  statistically  significant.  In  Appendix  C,  we  provide  a 
selection of comments made by respondents in all the conditions. 
 
Effects of training and experience 
  Table  2  shows  that  our  sample  of  257  economists  varied  widely  in  terms  of 
professorial rank, specialization within economics, and use of regression analysis in their 
work.  Are  these  classifications  related  to  accuracy  in  inferences  made?  Excluding 
Conditions 5 and 6 (where we have an unrealistic setting and answers were, on average, 
correct),  we  failed  to  find  any  relation  between  the  numbers  of  correct  answers  and 
professorial  rank  or  frequency  of  using  regression  analysis.  On  the  other  hand,  a 
significantly higher percentage of statisticians, financial economists and econometricians 
performed well relative to the average respondent (with, respectively, 64%, 56%, and 
51% providing correct answers compared to the overall average of 35%). When answers 
were accurate, the average time spent was also slightly higher, but the difference is not 
statistically  significant  (10.2  versus  9.3  minutes).  Table  4  shows  in  detail  the 
characteristics and proportions of respondents, who gave accurate answers in Conditions 
1 through 4.   
------------------------------------------ 




We conducted a survey designed to test the ability of economists to make probabilistic 
predictions from regression outputs presented in a manner similar to those published in 
leading economic journals. Given only the regression statistics usually reported in such   17 
journals, we find that many respondents made inappropriate inferences. In particular, they 
seemed to locate the uncertainty in prediction in estimates of the regression coefficients 
and not in the standard deviation of the estimated residuals (SDER). Indeed, responses 
hardly differed between cases where the “fit” of the estimated model varied between 0.25 
and 0.50.  
  We also provided some of our respondents with scatter plots of the regression 
together  with  explicit  information  on  the  SDER.  However,  this  had  only  a  small 
ameliorative effect, which suggests that respondents relied principally on the regression 
statistics (e.g., coefficients and their standard errors) to make their judgments and did not 
make use of the information presented graphically. Finally, we forced other respondents 
to rely on graphical representation by only providing a scatter plot and no regression 
statistics.  Interestingly,  members  of  this  group  complained  bitterly  that  they  had 
insufficient information to answer the questions posed but, nonetheless, took less time to 
answer  than  the  other  groups  and  –  most  importantly  –  were  more  accurate  in  their 
responses.  
  The economists in our survey had various levels of seniority in the profession, 
specialized in different branches of economics, and made differential use of regression 
analysis in their work.  Some of these characteristics were related to how they answered 
the questions we asked.  In particular, whereas rank and frequency of regression usage 
were  not  related  to  respondents’  performance,  statisticians,  financial  economists  and 
econometricians provided the most accurate answers to our questions.   
  Several objections could be made about our study in terms of, first: the nature of 
the questions asked; second, the particular respondents we managed to recruit; and third, 
the motivation of the latter to answer our questions.  
  First, we deliberately asked questions that are usually not posed in journal articles 
because  we  wanted  to  illuminate  economists’  appreciation  of  the  predictability  of 
economic relations as opposed to whether specific variables are or are not “significant.” 
From a policy perspective, this is important (McCloskey & Ziliak, 1996).  For example, 
even  though  economics  articles  typically  do  not  address  explicit  decision  making 
questions, economic models should be used to estimate, say, the probability of reaching 
given levels of output for specific levels of input. The questions are “tricky” only in the   18 
sense that they are not what economists typically ask.  However, we always provided all 
the data needed to answer the questions correctly. Moreover, there was no time limit and 
respondents could use computational tools or textbooks if they wanted.  
  Second, we did not achieve a high response rate from our pool of respondents.  As 
noted earlier, 26% of potential respondents took the time to open (and look at?) our 
survey questions and 9% answered.  Does this mean, however, that our respondents were 
biased and, if so, in what direction?  We don’t know and would need to conduct further 
in-depth studies to find out.  However, we did obtain a substantial number of respondents 
(257) who represent different characteristics of academic economists.  Parenthetically, we 
wonder  what  kind  of  responses  we  might  have  received  from  those  who  opened  the 
survey and then decided not to answer and particularly since in the “easiest” condition 
(only graphs) participants took the least time to answer (and were more accurate). 
  Third, by maintaining anonymity in responses, we were unable to offer incentives 
to  our  respondents.  However,  would  incentives  to  answer  these  questions  have  made 
much difference?  Clearly, without conducting a specific study we cannot say.  However, 
extrapolating from results in experimental economics, the consensus seems to be that 
incentives increase effort and reduce variance in responses but do not necessarily increase 
average accuracy (Camerer & Hogarth, 1999).  We also note that when professionals are 
asked questions relating to their competence, there would seem to be little incentive to 
provide a casual answer.  
Parenthetically, it is possible to argue that our survey actually simulates quite well 
the  circumstances  under  which  many  economists  read  journal  articles:  There  are  no 
explicit monetary incentives; readers do not wish to make additional computations; nor 
do they wish to do additional work to fill in gaps left by the authors; and time is precious.  
Thus, the framing of results by the authors is crucial.   
Since our investigation speaks to the issue of how statistical results should be 
presented in economics journals, it is important to ask what specific audience authors 
have in mind. The goal in the leading economics journals is scientific: to identify which 
variables impact some economic output and to assess the strength of the relation. Indeed, 
the discussion of results often involves terms such as a “strong” effect where the rhetoric 
reflects references to the size of t-statistics and the like. Moreover, the strength of a   19 
relation  is  often  described  in  terms  of  averages,  e.g.,  that  a  unit  increase  in  an 
independent variable implies, on average, a d increase in the dependent variable.   
As preliminary statements of the relevance of specific economic variables, this 
practice  is  acceptable.  Indeed,  although  authors  undoubtedly  want  to  emphasize  the 
scientific  importance  of  their  findings,  we  see  no  evidence  of  deliberate  attempts  to 
mislead readers into believing that results imply more control over the dependent variable 
than is, in fact, the case. In addition, the papers have been reviewed by peers who are 
typically  not  shy  about  expressing  reservations.  However,  the  typical  form  of 
presentation  can  lead  to  underestimating  the  uncertainty  implicit  in  the  underlying 
regression model. Specifically, there can be considerable variability around expectations 
of effects that needs to be calibrated in the interpretation of results. Thus, readers who 
don’t  “go  beyond  the  information”  given  and  take  the  trouble  to  calculate,  say,  the 
implications  of  some  decision-oriented  questions  may  gain  an  inaccurate  view  of  the 
results obtained.  
At one level, it can be argued that the principle of caveat emptor should apply. 
That is, consumers of economic research should know better how to use the information 
provided and it is their responsibility if they underestimate the uncertainty implicit in the 
results they are examining.  It is not the fault of the authors or the journals. We make two 
arguments against the caveat emptor principle as applied here. 
First,  as  demonstrated  by  the  results  of  our  survey,  even  knowledgeable 
economists  experience  difficulty  in  going  beyond  the  information  provided  in  typical 
outputs  of  regression  analysis.  In  particular,  they  underestimate  the  uncertainty  in 
explanatory  models.    If  one  wants  to  make  the  argument  that  people  “ought”  to  do 
something, then it should be also clearly demonstrated that they “can.”   
Second,  given  the  vast  quantities  of  economic  reports  available  today,  it  is 
unlikely that most readers will take the necessary steps to go beyond the information 
provided.  As  a  consequence,  by  reading  journals  in  economics  they  will  necessarily 
acquire a false impression of what knowledge gained from economic research allows one 
to say. In short, they will believe that economic outputs are far more predictable than is in 
fact the case.   20 
Parenthetically, we make all of the above statements assuming that econometric 
models describe empirical phenomena appropriately. At best, it can only be shown that 
model assumptions are approximately satisfied (they are not “rejected” by the data) and 
that,  whereas  the  model-data  fit  is  maximized within  the  particular  sample  observed, 
there is no guarantee that the estimated relations will be maintained in other samples.  
Indeed, the R
2 estimated on a fitting sample inevitably “shrinks” when predicting to a 
new sample and it is problematic to estimate a priori the amount of shrinkage.   
Furthermore,  in  all  the  conditions,  we  assume  that  the  errors  are  normally 
distributed, which might not be the case in naturally occurring settings. For instance, 
Taleb (2007) and Makridakis, Hogarth, and Gaba (2009) argue that statistical “outliers” 
are more common than typically assumed in social and economic environments and their 
effects are difficult to predict. Even though many estimation procedures in the published 
articles  do  not  require  normally  distributed  random  disturbances  to  obtain  consistent 
estimates, the explanations they provide through coefficient estimates and average values 
would be less accurate if the law of large numbers does not hold.  Hence decisions that 
are  weighted  towards  expected  values  and  coefficient  estimates  would  be  even  less 
accurate than our results indicate. 
This  discussion  leads  to  considering  what  might  be  done  to  improve  current 
practice.  Our  results  show  that  providing  graphs  alone  led  to  the  most  accurate 
inferences. However, since the comments made by our  respondents were so negative 
about this format, we do not deem it to be a practical solution. On the other hand, we 
believe that it is appropriate to present graphs together with summary statistics as we did 
in Situations 3 and 4. However, given the inaccuracy of our respondents’ answers, we 
believe that authors should provide aids in the form of internet links to sites that (a) 
explore  different  implications  of  the  analysis,  and  (b)  let  readers  pose  different 
probabilistic questions. In short, we propose providing simulation tools that allow readers 
to experience the uncertainty in the outcomes of the regression.
7 
Whereas our suggestion imposes an additional burden on authors (which can be 
lower with experience), it reduces effort and misinterpretation on the part of readers, and 
                                                 
7 For example, by following the link http://www.econ.upf.edu/~soyer/econometrics.html the reader can 
investigate many questions concerning the two regression set-ups that we examined in this paper as well as 
experience simulated outcomes (Soyer & Hogarth, in preparation).        21 
makes the article a more accessible scientific product. Moreover, it has the potential to 
correct statistical misinterpretations that were not identified by our study. As such we 
believe our suggestion goes a long way to toward increasing understanding of economic 
phenomena.  At  the  same  time,  our  suggestion  calls  for  additional  research  into 
understanding when and why different presentation formats lead to misinterpretation.  
In addition to suggesting changes in how statistical results should be reported in 
journals, our results also have implications for the teaching of statistical techniques to 
economists.  First, textbooks in econometrics should provide more coverage of how to 
report statistical results as well as instruction in how to make probabilistic predictions. 
Even  a  cursory  examination  of  leading  textbooks  shows  that  these  topics  currently 
receive very little attention and provide incomplete.  Indeed, the presentations provided in 
Conditions  1  and  2  are  consistent  with  the  prescriptions  of  Wooldridge  (2008),  the 
textbook  that  dedicates  the  largest  space  for  such  instructions,  and  thus  presumably 
suitable for an empirical publication in economics. And yet, we have demonstrated that 
economists need more information to evaluate correctly the outputs of their analyses. 
Second,  evaluating  the  predictive  ability  of  economic  models  should  become  an 
important component of the teaching of econometrics. Indeed, if this is linked to the 
development  and  use  of  simulation  methods,  it  could  become  a  most  attractive  (and 
illuminating) part of any econometrics syllabus. 
Finally, we note that scientific knowledge advances to the extent that we are able 
to predict and control different phenomena.  However, if we cannot make appropriate 
probabilistic  statements  about  our  predictions,  our  ability  to  assess  our  knowledge 
accurately is seriously compromised. 
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  Journals:  AER  QJE  JPE  RES  Total  % of Total 
Studies that               
...use linear regression analysis 
  
42  41  15  13  111  x 
...provide both the sample standard 
deviation of the dependent variable(s) and 
the R
2 statistic    
16  27  11  12  66  59% 
...do NOT provide R
2 statistics  
  
12  9  0  1  22  20% 
...do NOT provide the sample standard 
deviation of the dependent variable(s)    
21  9  4  0  34  31% 
...provide the estimated constant, along with 
its standard error     
19  14  4  1  38  34% 
...provide a scatter plot  
  
19  16  5  2  42  38% 
...provide SDER 
  
5  3  1  1  10  9% 
   26 
 
    Condition:  1  2  3  4  5  6  Total  %'s 
Requests to participate     568  531  548  510  438  418      3,013     
Requests opened     143  152  140  131  113  98  777  26% 
Surveys completed     45  45  49  38  36  44  257  9% 
                     
Position                       
Professor        17  14  19  18  17  22  107  42% 
Associate Professor     8  7  12  10  6  2  45  18% 
Assistant Professor     12  18  16  9  9  12  76  30% 
Senior Lecturer     0  2  1  0  0  2  5  2% 
Lecturer        6  4  1  1  3  3  18  7% 
Post-Doctoral Researcher  2  0  0  0  1  3  6  2% 
   Total     45  45  49  38  36  44  257    
                     
Research fields                   
Econometrics     14  11  10  14  6  12  67  13% 
Labor economics     12  11  14  10  9  8  64  12% 
Monetary economics     5  2  5  2  2  1  17  3% 
Financial economics     4  5  4  3  1  1  18  3% 
Behavioral economics     3  7  2  3  2  6  23  4% 
Developmental economics  8  2  9  5  5  2  31  6% 
Health economics     4  3  5  1  1  4  18  3% 
Political economy     3  5  7  4  3  4  26  5% 
Public economics     9  6  10  8  4  6  43  8% 
Environmental economics  1  2  3  2  1  1  10  2% 
Industrial organization     2  6  6  2  8  7  31  6% 
Game theory     4  1  4  5  2  7  23  4% 
International economics     6  6  7  2  2  3  26  5% 
Macroeconomics      9  9  13  6  6  6  49  9% 
Microeconomics     11  4  11  7  9  10  52  10% 
Economic history     2  2  6  2  1  2  15  3% 
Statistics        3  6  1  1  0  3  14  3% 
Other        0  0  1  0  0  0  1  0% 
                       
Use of regression analysis                 
Never        7  5  11  11  6  15  55  23% 
Some        11  16  17  10  17  13  84  36% 
Often        16  14  7  7  7  8  59  25% 
Always        5  5  8  6  6  7  37  16% 
   Total     39  40  43  34  36  43  235    
                     
Average minutes spent on survey  11.6  10.3  7.4  7.5  5.7  6.5  8.1   
<Std. dev.>      <12.0>  <7.8>  <7.1>  <5.3>  <3.9>  <6.0>  <7.7>   
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      Condition:  1  2  3  4  5  6 
      R
2  0.50  0.25  0.50  0.25  0.50  0.25 
Percentage of participants  whose answer to:             
Question (1) was X < 10       (Incorrect)     72  67  61  41  3  7 
Question (2) was X < 10       (Incorrect)     68  70  67  47  3  15 
Question (3) was above 80%    (Incorrect)     60  63  63  49  9  7 
Question (4) was approx. 50%  (Correct)     84  88  93  84  91  93 
                   
Approximate correct answers are                
Question 1           48  84  48  84  48  84 
Question 2           67  118  67  118  67  118 
Question 3           51%  51%  51%  51%  51%  51% 
Question 4           50%  50%  50%  50%  50%  50% 
                   
Number of participants                 
Question 1           39  36  44  32  31  41 
Question 2           35  30  39  32  30  39 
Question 3           45  43  49  37  32  43 
Question 4           44  41  49  37  32  43 
 
Notes: 
(1)  For questions 1, 2, and 3, there are significant differences between Conditions 1 and 5, 3 and 5, 2 and 4, and 4 
and 6 (t> 2.90, p<.01, for all comparisons). 
(2)  For question 4, there are no significant differences between Conditions. 
(3)  There are no significant differences between Conditions 1 and 2, 3 and 4, and 5 and 6 for all questions.   28 
 
  Condition  1  2  3  4 






Position                   
Professor        17 (4)  14 (5)  19 (6)  18 (11)  68 (26)  38% 
Associate Professor  8 (2)  7 (3)  12 (4)  10 (8)  37 (17)  46% 
Assistant Professor  12 (5)  18 (4)  16 (6)  9 (2)  55 (17)  31% 
Senior Lecturer     0 (0)  2 (1)  1 (0)  0 (0)  3 (1)  33% 
Lecturer        6 (1)  4 (0)  1 (0)  0 (0)  12 (1)  8% 
Post-Doctoral Researcher  2 (0)  0 (0)  0 (0)  0 (0)  2 (0)  0% 
   Total     45 (12)  45 (13)  49 (13)  38 (21)  177 (62)  35% 
                 
Research fields               
Econometrics     14 (6)  11 (6)  10 (5)  14 (8)  49 (25)  51% 
Labor economics  12 (5)  11 (2)  14 (3)  10 (7)  47 (17)  36% 
Monetary economics  5 (1)  2 (0)  5 (2)  2 (0)  14 (3)  21% 
Financial economics  4 (1)  5 (3)  4 (3)  3 (2)  16 (9)  56% 
Behavioral economics  3 (1)  7 (2)  2 (1)  3 (0)  15 (4)  27% 
Developmental economics  8 (1)  2 (1)  9 (3)  5 (1)  24 (6)  25% 
Health economics  4 (0)  3 (0)  5 (1)  1 (1)  13 (2)  15% 
Political economy  3 (1)  5 (1)  7 (3)  4 (2)  19 (7)  37% 
Public economics  9 (1)  6 (1)  10 (4)  8 (6)  33 (12)  36% 
Environmental economics  1 (0)  2 (1)  3 (0)  2 (1)  8 (2)  25% 
Industrial organization  2 (1)  6 (1)  6 (1)  2 (1)  16 (3)  19% 
Game theory     4 (1)  1 (1)  4 (1)  5 (2)  14 (5)  36% 
International economics  6 (2)  6 (0)  7 (1)  2 (1)  21 (4)  19% 
Macroeconomics   9 (2)  9 (2)  13 (2)  6 (5)  37 (11)  30% 
Microeconomics  11 (2)  4 (2)  11 (5)  7 (4)  33 (13)  39% 
Economic history  2 (0)  2 (0)  6 (3)  2 (1)  12 (4)  33% 
Statistics        3 (1)  4 (4)  1 (1)  1 (1)  11 (7 )  64% 
Other        0 (0)  0 (0)  1 (1)  0 (0)  1 (1)  100% 
                  
Use of regression analysis           
Never        7 (1)  5 (0)  11 (7)  11 (5)  34 (13)  38% 
Some        11 (4)  16 (6)  17 (0)  10 (5)  54 (15)  28% 
Often        16 (4)  14 (5)  7 (2)  7 (6)  44 (17)  39% 
Always        5 (3)  5 (1)  8 (4)  6 (2)  24 (10)  42% 
   Total     39 (12)  40 (12)  43 (13)  34 (18)  156 (55)  35% 
                 
Average minutes spent  12 (10.9)  10.6 (12.6)  7.4 (11.2)  7.5 (7.4)  8.1 (10.2)  8.1 
Std. dev.      12 (9.4)  7.8 (9)  7.1 (12.3)  5.3 (5.2)  7.7 (9)  7.7 
 
Table 4: Relations between training, experience and responses in Conditions 1 to 4 
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Figure 1: Presentation of Condition 1 
 
Consider the econometric model 
 
Yi   = C + β Xi + ei 
 
    Where: 
Y       : Economic payoff, given the choice of X.                 
X      : A continuous choice variable which is costly to undertake 
C      : Constant 
β      : The effect of X on Y 
     e      : Random perturbation; ei | Xi ˜ N[0, σ
2] with E(ei)=0, Cov(ei, ej)=0 
                and Cov(ei, Xi)=0. 
 
In this setting, the goal is to estimate β and C, based on a random sample of X and Y with 







Variable  Mean  Std. Dev. 
X  50.72  28.12 
Y  51.11  40.78 
   
















Results indicate that constant C is not statistically different from zero and that X has a 
statistically significant positive effect on Y. β is estimated to be 1.001. 
 
Suppose that this model is indeed a very good approximation of the real world relation 
between  X  and  Y,  and  that  the  linear  estimation  is  suitable.  Furthermore,  among 
alternative specifications, this model is the one that gives the highest R-squared.  
 
The  above  result  is  a  useful  tool  for  decision-making  purposes:  It  links  the  economic 
payoffs Y to the choice variable X. One can now use this relation to predict one’s payoffs 
or to select their X and to obtain desired levels of Y. More importantly, the above model 
links Y and X correctly. This is crucial because increasing X is costly and knowing this true 
relationship helps individuals make more accurate decisions. 
 
Dependent Variable: Y 
1.001                   X 
    (0.033)** 
0.32        Constant 
(1.92) 
                 R
2    0.50 
                N  1 000 
       Standard errors in parentheses 
      ** Significant at 95% confidence level 




The OLS fit of the model to this sample gives the following results:   30 




















Variable  Mean  Std. Dev. 
X  49.51  28.74 
Y  51.22  59.25 
 
 
Dependent Variable: Y 
1.02                   X 
    (0.056)** 
0.61        Constant 
(3.74) 
                 R
2    0.25 
                N  1 000 
       Standard errors in parentheses 
      ** Significant at 95% confidence level 
        N is the number of observations 
   31 









Note: The standard deviation of the estimated residuals is 29. 
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Figure 5a: Answers to (1) in Condition 1 (N=39)  Figure 5b: Answers to (2) in Condition 1 (N=35) 
 
Figure 5c: Answers to (3) in Condition 1 (N=45) 
 
Figure 5d: Answers to (4) in Condition 1 (N=44) 
 
 
(correct answer: 47) 
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Figure 6a: Answers to (1) in Condition 5 (N=31)  Figure 6b: Answers to (2) in Condition 5 (N=30) 
Figure 6c: Answers to (2) in Condition 5 (N=32) 
 
Figure 6d: Answers to (4) in Condition 5 (N=32) 
 
 
(correct answer: 67) 
 
 
(correct answer: 47) 
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Figure 7a: Answers to (1) in Condition 6 (N=41)  Figure 7b: Answers to (2) in Condition 6 (N=39) 
Figure 7c: Answers to (3) in Condition 6 (N=43)  Figure 7d: Answers to (4) in Condition 6 (N=43) 
   
 
(correct answer: 82) 
 
 
(correct answer: 116) 
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Appendix A:  Rationale for answers to the four questions 
Preliminary comments 
We test whether or not decision makers knowledgeable about regression analysis 
correctly evaluate the unpredictability of an outcome, given the standard presentation of 
linear  regression  results  in  an  empirical  study.  To  isolate  the  effects  of  a  possible 
misperception,  we  created  a  basic  specification.  In  this  hypothetical  situation,  a 
continuous variable X causes an outcome Y. Furthermore the effect of one more X is 
estimated to be almost exactly equal to 1. The majority of the fluctuation in Y is due to a 
random disturbance uncorrelated with X, which is normally and independently distributed 
with constant variance.  Hence, the decision maker knows that all the assumptions of the 
classical linear regression model hold (see, e.g., Greene, 2003).  
 
Answers to Questions 1 and 2 
In  the  first  two  questions,  participants  are  asked  to  advise  a  hypothetical 
individual  who  desires  to  have  a  certain  level  of  control  over  the  outcomes.  This 
corresponds to the desire to obtain a certain amount of Y through some action X.    The 
first question reflects the desire to obtain a positive outcome, whereas the second reflects 
the desire to be better off with respect to an alternative of no-action.    
If one considers only averages, the estimation results suggest that an individual 
should expect the relation between X and Y to be one to one. However, when could an 
individual claim that a certain outcome has occurred because of their actions, and not due 
to chance? How much does chance have to say in the realization of an outcome? The 
answers to these questions depend on the standard deviation of the estimated residuals 
(SDER). 
In  a  linear  regression  analysis,  SDER
2  corresponds  to  the  variance  of  the 
dependent variable that is unexplained by the independent variables and is captured by 
the statistic (1-R
2).  In Conditions 1 and 3 this is given as 50%. One can compute the 
SDER using the (1-R
2) statistic and the variance of Y: 
 
  SDER = se(ˆ  e  ) = (Var(Y)(1- R
2) = (40.78
2)(0.5) @29                 (A1)   36 
The answer to the first question can be found by constructing a one-sided 95% 
confidence interval using (A1). We are looking for X where; 
 
Prob(Z >-( ˆ  C + ˆ  b  X)/se(ˆ  e  )) = Prob(Z>-(0.32+1.001X)/29) = 0.95 ; Z~N(0,1)       (A2) 
 
Thus,  to  obtain  a  positive  payoff  with  95%  probability,  an  individual  has  to 
choose: 
               X= (1.645*29 -0.32)/1.001@ 47                  (A3) 
 
The  answer  to  the  second  question  requires  one  additional  calculation. 
Specifically,  we  need  to  know  the  standard  deviation  of  the  difference  between  two 
random variables, that is 
 
               (Yi | Xi =xi) – (Yj | Xj = 0), where xi > 0.                (A4) 
 
We know that (Yi | Xi) is an identically, independently and normally distributed 
random error with an estimated standard deviation of again 29. Given that a different and 
independent shock occurs for different individuals and actions, the standard deviation of 
(A4) becomes: 
 
[ ] 0) | ( - ) | ( = = j j i i i X Y x X Y Var  
                                            (A5) 
   
Thus, the answer to question 2 is: 
 
          X= (1.645*41-0.32)/1.001@67      (A6) 
 
For Condition 2 (and thus also 4 and 6), similar reasoning is involved.  For these 
conditions, the equivalent of equation (A1) is 
 
41 ) 29 29 ( ) 0 | ( ) | (
2 2 @ + = = + = = j j i i i X Y Var x X Y Var  37 
Pr(Yi > 0.936  | Xi =1)  =   Pr(ˆ  C + ˆ  b  Xi +ˆ  e    >  0.936  | X =1) =  
=  Pr(ˆ  e    >  0.936- ˆ  C - ˆ  b  X  | X =1)  =  Pr(
ˆ  e 
se(ˆ  e  )
  >  
0.936- ˆ  C - ˆ  b  X
se(ˆ  e  )
  | X =1) =  




SDER=  51 ) 75 . 0 )( 25 . 59 ( ) 1 )( ( ( ) ˆ (
2 2 @ = - = R Y Var e se            (A7) 
 
such that the answer to question 1 is: 
 
X= (1.645*51-0.62)/1.02 @82         (A8) 
 
As for question 2:  
 
[ ] 0) | ( - ) | ( = = j j i i i X Y x X Y Var  =  72 ) 51 51 (
2 2 @ +                                 (A9) 
 
So that the answer to question 2 is:   
 
X= (1.645*72 -0.62)/1.02 @116                (A10) 
 
Answers to Questions 3 and 4 
Here,  we  inquire  about  how  decision  makers  weight  the  different  sources  of 
uncertainty within the dependent variable, given the typical communication of estimation 
results.   
These questions provide insight as to whether or not the presentation of the results 
frames  the  participants  into  considering  that  the  fluctuation  around  the  estimated 
coefficient is a larger source of uncertainty in the realization of Y than it really is.   
Question 3 asks about the probability of obtaining an outcome above the lower-
bound of the 95% confidence interval of the estimated coefficient, given a value of X=1. 
In Conditions 1, 3 and 5, the lower-bound is 0.936. We can find an approximate 




                             (A11) 
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Question 4 asks about the probability of obtaining an outcome above the point 
estimate, given a value of X=1. In Conditions 1, 3 and 5, the point estimate is 1.001. We 




                        (A12) 
 
For  questions  3  and  4  of  Condition  2  (and  thus  4  and  6),  we  follow  similar 
reasoning using the appropriate estimates. Thus, for question 3,  
 
     
51 . 0 ) 015 . 0 ( 1 )
51
1.02 - 0.61 - 0.911
(   - 1
    1) X   |  
Var(e)
X ˆ - C ˆ - 0.911
  >  
Var(e)
e ˆ
Pr(   1) = X   |   X ˆ - C ˆ - 0.911   >   e ˆ Pr(
  =   1) = X   |   0.911   >   e ˆ + X ˆ + C ˆ Pr(   1) = X   |   0.911 > Pr(Y i i i
@ - F - = F =





                            (A13)         
And for question 4,  
     
5 . 0 ) 01 . 0 ( 1 )
51
1.02 - 0.61 - 1.02
(   - 1  
  1) X   |  
Var(e)
X ˆ - C ˆ - 1.02
  >  
Var(e)
e ˆ
Pr(   1) = X   |   X ˆ - C ˆ - 1.02   >   e ˆ Pr(   =
  1) = X   |   1.02   >   e ˆ + X ˆ + C ˆ Pr(     1) = X   |   1.02 > Pr(Y i i i














5 . 0 ) 01 . 0 ( 1 )
29
1.001 - 0.32 - 1.001
(   - 1  
  1) X   |  
Var(e)
X ˆ - C ˆ - 1.001
  >  
Var(e)
e ˆ
Pr(   1) = X   |   X ˆ - C ˆ - 1.001   >   e ˆ Pr(  
=   1) = X   |   1.001   >   e ˆ + X ˆ + C ˆ Pr(   1) = X   |   1.001 > Pr(Y i i i
@ - F - = F =
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Figure B2a: Answers to (1) in Condition 2 (N=36) 
 
Figure B2b: Answers to (2) in Condition 2 (N=30) 
 
Figure B2c: Answers to (3) in Condition 2 (N=43) 
 
Figure B2d: Answers to (4) in Condition 2 (N=41) 
   
 
 
(correct answer: 116) 
 
 
(correct answer: 82) 
























Figure B3a: Answers to (1) in Condition 3 (N=44) 
 
Figure B3b: Answers to (2) in Condition 3 (N=39) 
 
Figure B3c: Answers to (3) in Condition 3 (N=48) 
) 
Figure B3d: Answers to (4) in Condition 3 (N=49) 
 
 
   
 
(correct answer: 47) 
























Figure B4a: Answers to (1) in Condition 4 (N=32) 
 
Figure B4b: Answers to (2) in Condition 4 (N=32) 
 
Figure B4c: Answers to (3) in Condition 4 (N=38) 
) 
Figure B4d: Answers to (4) in Condition 4 (N=37) 
 
   
 
(correct answer: 116) 
 
 
(correct answer: 82) 
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Appendix C: Some of the comments made by the participants 
 
Conditions 1 and 2 
A)  Selected comments made by those who answered correctly. 
·  This was surprisingly hard.  It made me realize how little attention I generally pay to 
the constant, which is so important for statements about predicted values. 
·  Not sure what you expect from this survey - Most people who estimate regressions in 
economics don't use them for prediction but for making inferences on the values of 
the coefficients. 
·  A graph would help! 
·  Your first question with the X=1 is a bit odd given average X=50. Would be nice if 
after the done button we get the answers. 
·  I may have misunderstood the question, but the regression results don’t easily allow 
you to answer it. It seems to require a forecast and standard error of forecast for a 
value of X which is far from the mean. It would require some calculation to get these 
from the reported results. 
·  Your questions come across as trick questions, though I'm guessing that they are not 
supposed to be. 
B)  Selected comments made by those who answered incorrectly. 
·  I don't think the questions you have in this survey are the typical questions an 
empirical researcher is interested in as far as regression results are concerned. This 
looks more like a set of simple statistics exercises. Anyway, it was fun. Good luck 
with your research! 
·  Given the assumptions laid out at beginning, we know that Yhat = Chat+Bhat*X is an 
unbiased estimate of the true Y. But to answer the questions, we need to know the 
variance of the prediction error, that is Var(Y-Yhat). This variance is: Var(Y-Yhat) = 
Var(Yhat) + Var(u), where we can estimate Var(u) by SSR/(n-1) = [59.25^2*999*(1-
0.25)]/999, and where Var(Yhat) depends on Cov(Chat,Bhat), which is not provided.    
Given the assumptions, this error will be approximately normally distributed.   43 
·  I believe these statements have not been expressed in a statistically correct way; it 
should refer to confidence levels instead of probabilities. 
C)  Selected comments made by those who did not answer. 
·  If this is a true experimental context with respect to X, model appears not correctly 
specified due to constant. Q1-Q4 can be answered using standard software so why 
would anyone do calculations by hand. 
 
Conditions 3 and 4 
A)  Selected comments made by those who answered correctly. 
·  Trying to think carefully through these questions, I realized that I would have to 
review the theory of forecast error, which is not something that I use regularly. 
Perhaps the answers are easy in the end, but one would have to review quite a bit of 
regression analysis to verify that point to oneself. 
·  I just made quasi-educated guesses.  I'm curious to see how wrong or right they are. 
·  Could you send to the participants to this survey what your main results are? It would 
be simply matter to send a link to the same mailing list used to ask for compiling the 
survey. Your topics (though quite uncommon for the typical quantitative analysis) are 
very interesting. My compliments. 
·  I enjoyed taking the survey. I would be interested in learning about the results. 
·  Very nice questions! 
·  To first order, only the variation in the error term matters here. Also, I only did the 
calculations very approximately. I think the graph is helpful; it reminded me that the 
root MSE is important here. Nice question to ask. 
·  I used plot more than numbers for this 
·  Cute.  I bet you get lots of wrong answers! 
·  All probabilities are computed conditionally on the parameter estimates, i.e. 
conditionally on the observed sample 
·  Definitely an interesting question.  I would appreciate it if you could send me the 
precise answers.   44 
·  I used the scatter plot to draw my inferences rather than the estimated relationship. I 
would be interested to know how accurate my answers were (or the correct answers 
for each value of x). Thanks for including me. 
B)  Selected comments made by those who answered incorrectly. 
·  These questions are phrased in very unusual ways, ways that are much different than 
when I teach the concepts in undergraduate econometrics. 
·  It was irritating 
·  the questions are too messy and not clear enough 
·  These questions appear to suppose that the constant can be set to zero. If one does 
this, the estimated slope coefficient will change. 
·  You may want to also provide the covariance between the estimates of C and beta. 
 
·  I found the way the questions are posed unclear, in that the preamble says "the model 
links Y and X correctly" -- I find that ambiguous: are we supposed to assume that, or 
are you telling us that is true? 
C)  Selected comments made by those who did not answer. 
·  Why should I do this? 
·  I do not wish to spend the time working these out.  However, I would get the bayesian 
predictive density for Y, which would be a t-distribution, and work out the probability 
from that.   Other answers might (1) treat the betahats as equal to the true values and 
ignore uncertainty in estimation of the betas, or (2) treat the betas as uncertain with st 
deviations given by the st errors of the betahats. I view neither of these as correct.  
The Bayesian solution is the only coherent one. 
Conditions 5 and 6 
A)  Selected comments made by those who answered correctly. 
·  I did not use any statistical knowledge to arrive at my answers, simply looked at the 
diagram. 
·  The scatter plot was not really helpful to draw inferences, so I was guessing from 
visual inspection.   45 
·  Was I supposed to have estimates for the coefficients, coefficient standard errors, and 
error term (I didn't)?  All I could really do was eyeball the graph and take a guess at 
the coefficients and proceed from there. 
·  The questions seem to be ones that are not often addressed based on regression 
analysis, and this particular presentation did not include information that would be 
very useful in getting the answers and is normally generated by regression analysis. 
·  Interesting problem.  I hope I answered correctly! 
·  This was fun! 
·  I've answer the previous questions under the assumption that the 1000 data where 
generated by the econometric model.    I don't see how to estimate beta with the 
information provided, then gave a look to the graph. 
·  I am not quite sure what you are getting at here, but I do not think the questions are 
well posed. For a start, you should have given the fitted regression equation and 
assoc. standard errors. Also, the first two questions are virtually indistinguishable 
from one another (other than to state that the second probability is slightly less than 
the first). Obviously I do not know what your precise motive is here, but I am not sure 
you have thought this out carefully enough to achieve it!    Good luck in your work. 
B)  Selected comments made by those who answered incorrectly. 
·  The assumptions on the model are incomplete. In order to answer these questions you 
need to compute conditional probabilities and for this you need to assume conditional 
normality (or joint normality of e and X). Note that normality of e alone does not 
allow you to compute the required probabilities. 
C)  Selected comments made by those who did not answer. 
·  Not enough info. 
·  I would need to know the standard error of the beta coefficient to answer. 